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In  s1.::.llmi ·ctinrr, its  G:co Cl:,  P::.;Jer  on  "Em-p1~;yo  o  P:::.l~t ic  :\ -p:::. tio21  (") 
....  d  Com·:.l:J.ny  stl~l.wtnro  in  th~ :Su:c'Yx;:m  Commw1.i ty  9  the  Comm:·Lssion 
:i1o:qc:::;  to  bril.·.c;  ~~.b·J1.'."l:i  n. 
11 COJ':-:'t:~tlct:i.v:c  dob:o,to  which v;ill  or::::b13  tho 
~~;:Jll1lill.mi ty  In.r:;t:i. "G1xi.;:i.ons  to  :i:'L.:r.cJ  uoll'.·cions  which  c::1n  iJa  ::.cc.:.:ptod  b~r  . , 
;~.  :;l'.rY:;JO:tn  COEl) 'c:<r  ~::t::.tute  :;.:.~,~:·.  tihc  :~·':c·c_))0:J::•.l  for  ::.  :L"i-~'th  Dircct:i.vc  o:_,_ 
t;:l::~  structu:c~~  .. /' -,;ub1ic  limit·.;(  C"·LnX<.lic;s  showed.  tlK.t  thc::  C:Jmmis::;:i_nn' 3 
-::-T:i_·:::-~i:J.:-::.1  :lL~.n~;  1  :_:crti_ cuL:rly  :::.:~  r:.;:~:.:.rrJc  en rp 0r::  t2  [~trL'.cture  c:.ml 
cnrll<)Y08  :pn..l~t:i_c:i.):-:t:i_on;  couJ.~l  no·c  '.Jo  put  into  effect  iEll!leclif"tG1y 
b::c:c.nse  tl-18~.'  ;_"_:i.!:~  C.l·:,t  mo.lce  ::;t1.:~:":i_c:i_el'lt  ~:..J.J.ow:•.nce  :':'or  t~l8  ciff'Gre:ilt 
It h2d  come  to  the 
· c·='-~:·.clL.1.sion  tl·-~.-c  tl'l•J  J.::wv  r:md  :~n~,~ct:i.ce  n::-Jw  e:;-eistiHg  :i.n  tll<J  I1ombcr 
:>c::'.-Gos  l':·:mlc~  !.r.vc  ·i.;o:;  ba  t:.J~,~,J~  r,lo:c~:;  into  conr;idGrJ.t:~_._p_  2.1:r.(  ::.  more 
( ;:  )  Thl:;  Grec;~- ::?~~-~, 2'~  on  IE111:9}_c):,.,;;:;  :;_>,·.:..:-t:i. cip:::. tion  ;-:>JJ.d  r;,,Ei)<~-~J~_,.  Structu:;:·:.: 
j_::.1  tl1.c  ~-:;;~l~·-<) .J, ~~~J  .. Connn1.1n.i t~~- ~.--.r.-~~c  L~_l".'.-:'  .. ft  C.:c(  iD.  En:~li  cl1 ..  ~C1'1 2  ·~)T'izi:n.~~~ 
r··~.1(~lj_;Jl'1  ·:~o:,:t  "',."~~;os  tl1C:)  tGI"Tl  ~;:·_;.:·,.,::·t~~-cj_l)::--;,tiOD.r~  ~J;:::  tlJ.~~  ()3J.~Ol''"\-~l  t8l":"D. 
~~~·or  c:.ll  t~~~~!C;i~  o~:~  ~LJ:?¥r·tici):::  .. -c~~-:.r~~-- ~J_~~  .:.:;nl~Jlo~r..:;cs  o...r~_c_  tT·:""'_(_'J  ,.J.D.i(~r12 o 
1'::?::'.-rtic",_,,:·:i.;j_.,::,n  w:;,s  roE(·::;:c'_;,- c;:):..7'1ct1y  in  ~11  t~l8  Ccnmmni t:y 
l~;.I:..C:~Ll~\r:;c~J  (;::c;)~_1-C  ?or  G~;,.;j:"Y~l:-'.:<~"  ~~~~-;  G·-2'J'El~-:.T1 •  ""VerDic~:~  ~;_l~_C:'Jl'"'rectl~.r 
rcn.f.l~Cl"UL~  !l·):.-·~::..-..·:;ici:!~:.tioJ-:r.::  ~j~_:- ::~  :~~--:~\}:JSt~·~_r;nnJ  ... lJ:J<'!.a  1  c:.  tc:cln  ,j··tllich~  ~--~.t 
1~:: c..st  il'J.  tT·:-:.c:_,~  l"!.Ili C21  us  ~·-:.--.·~0;  JJ_;..·~;_;  .,__  !F'  .. J:~l---~")vvl~r  0.8~.-:illO  C.  L.:'l:J.7..l1ill~~  C; 
Tll.is  c:.~ll.;-J.J·~~- .....  J  CCl'""'t;.-~_iJl  :.!-I:.1·~:1_~-~~t  -_;?  co11?usio:rl  ir1  t11c  (:;_f"~!Cl.lS[.:i:Jj_1.a 
In thu  Gc:c·:-.Fxl  vcrr::i.on  :<·  ·c:Li ::  =?.c:.::Y·rt,  the  S:J.:?J_i:::b  tern  11T'.rti-
ci  ~Jc~tic~l  j·;  ~\~=/~;-= 1_1  lJc  tr~'lY18]_:···.-G:::!l~.  !J~:r  tlle  E~cncr.;~l  ttJJ.."lEl  ::-~--~:~_·tvvil-"")J.cl.llJ.(;n .. 
Th:Ls  teo.~r-:l  <J!c!.~)l'·-~.ces  2.11  .. -.-l":.l:J  ;_;:.:·  om:pl')yoc  inv-:;.1~tcEcs:.:•:t  :~.n  econor-1:i.c 
:-..::'.d  r-~oci:--.}_  (;c:i.sion-mo.Li:~.::-~,  :-.:<.  incluc1e~.::  the::  r:)oc:i_;·:i_c  ~:orm  o:~ 
Jo.rtici_,, :.t:'.cd  ,:: 'JS:i. .9JD.teC.  :i.:-1.  ~:-e;::-EF:.n  by 
111';i  tborTt:~El.l'Jlr~·-C
11  (in :S;.v:lj_  ::;J~l 
11 C('-r~o-J:;r.~->-,-,,-; ,.,,-c-:  iJl'l 11 )  111lfii'~ 1  <::~:·:  r-:~·1  °'TJ10y"' -,c,  h?VQ  ·-~-'- .-,c,---..,1  "''"';  - -~ 
:;C~l1 1:~ffij_;--~~;_:_~< -[i:-:C:L'Ll
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The  Sub-Committee  welcomes  the  Commission's  publication 
of a  Green Paper in order to  stimulate  a  broad discussion,  and  con-
siders this to  be  a  good  way  of looking for more  flexible  solutions. 
It considers that  employee  participation in the  broadest 
sense  of the  ·term is a  desirable development  in a  democratic  society,. 
But opinions  are  divided as to  the  objects of the  discussion.., 
Some  members  maintain that  the  object  should  be  the_introduction of 
a  Co~~m1ity system of  comp~y law,  others that it should  be  the  cre-
ation of a  Community  legal framework  for  companies  leaving the riiember 
States completely  free  to fill it out as they wish. 
The'·  Sub-Corruni ttee  endorses  the  following statement  made 
by the  COJnmission  :  "In this field  as in others  •••  the  goal  iG 
not  instant .uniformity for uniformity's  sake,  nor is it desired to 
place  a  restraint on positive developments  vvhich  are  in progress in 
certain countries.  The  objective is the  gradual  removal  of U!l.naccep-
table degrees  of divergence  between  the  structures and  policies of 
the  Nember  States. 11 
...... 
A. COtlPANY  STRUCTURE 
The  Commission's  basic  argument  in support  of its proposals 
has not  changed  :  "At  the present  time  ••• coDpani:es  are  incorporated 
under  the  separate  laws  of the nine Member  States.  There  are 
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sul'sta"':'ltial  d:Lfferences  betwe€m  t.hese. nationo..l  laws  1  relating in 
particular,  to  thL:o  internal structure  of  companies 9  the  powers  of 
directors,  the  rights of shareholders  and  of the  employees.,  This 
situation constitutes a  real barrier to cross-frontier activities, 
l)oth for ·(jhose  who  might  deal with  a  compa.'1.y  and  for the  companies 
themselves&
11 
In its proposal for  a  Jl.egu.lation  embodying  a  Statute  for 
the  European  Company  and  its Proposal  for  a  Pifth Directive  on  the 
structure  of public  limited  companies,  the  Commission  propose,_"  a 
two-tier borc.rd  structure  for public  companies~  In  ad.di tion to  the 
shareholders'  meeting,  there  would :be  2- :·~c..:.'1c.::_;ecen"G  Board,  responsible 
for  the  day-to--C!.ay  nmn.ing. of the  compan3r  ~  2.nd  a  Supervisory  Bos,rd  ~ 
vvhich  would  a1Jpoir-'t  the  I1ana,?;ement  Boa~cd  enct  supervise  its activities, 
This  systen1,  which is already working  succem:::fully  in  some  of tho 
member  States,  was  to  take  the  place,  in the  remaining Member  States, 
of the unitary or classic  system9  unc.er  which there is only  one 
. goven1inc body in ado.i tion to  the  shcroL~>1d·.:?rs•  meeting8 
In its Green Paper the  Commission reiterates its belief 
th2.t  the  two-tier_  s~rstem such as  already  e:;:ists  in  some  1'/Iember  States 
is the  best  system  from  the  point of view of both satisfyin:?: the 
requi:r.l'ments  of the  large,  mcdern  company  or  grour  of companies  and 
answering the  need  for public  accou..'1.tabili ty  ~  The  Corrn:nissio:::1  consiriers 
that its iiievv  is borne  :""Jut  by  the  C!nergcncc  even within  the  classic 
system of  a  division· of roles_  corres:pondi~"lg to  the  div'i.sion  forma-
lized  j_n  the two-tier  system~  In  the  Comrnissi on's view 1  ho,Never, 
in today's large  companies  and  groups  of  compa..11.ies~  whose  capital 
is often widely  dispersed  and  which frequ0ntly  employ  a  h~rge vwrk-
force  spread  over numerous  establishmcnto, formal  separation of roles 
between  8,  ma.c"lagement  2nd  a  Sllpervisory  b(:d3··  is a  surer way  of  achievin:':~ 
effective supervision of li!2J.lagement  in  t~1e  intcrsts of both share-
holders  ru1d  workers. 
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.  The  Coillmission  8.d.mits,  however,  that 
11one  has  to  recog11ize 
the  difficulty that there  would- be  f0r  those:  States,  with stronc; 
industrial  and  commercial traditions,  all of  whose  compc.  .. nies  have 
one-board  systems,  to  introduce  with  iEll!iediate  applica:t;ion  ~  a  ::."eform 
of such importance.  The  fact that  the·. reluctance  of those  conco::o:·ned 
may  be ·attributable rt1ore  to  fears  dr;~rivir,g from their present  lacl~ 
of lmowledge  of the  s;ystera proposed  th~:m to  nny  actual  distl.dVlliJ.tac::cs 
of the  system,  does not  substa.11.tially al  tor the  diffict:lty confront1ng 
governments.," 
B  ..  ElVIPLOYEE  Pl\RTICIP{!.':HON 
In its Green Paper the  Commission  s.ttempts  to  analy-ze  -the 
complex  syste:;1s  of relations in the  Member  States betweer_  employers 
and  worke::r.·s  or their respective  associc:~tions  and  trade unions,  w!'.J..ch 
bear the  sta::-,1p  of different historical backgrounds  and.  social con-
ditions,.  The  Commission  comes  to  the  ccnclusion that these  systems 
of relations,  whose  various  elements  are  interdependent  and  comple!:Qent 
one  another,  may  produce  the  same  effect,  viz& 
11 
....  what  is achieved 
by  cne  approach in one  cov.ntry  or en-terprise  may  on  occasion be 
achieved  by  another approach  elsewhere~
11 
The  i~nediate motive  behind  the  Co~nission's proposals  to 
s-t;r:mgthen  the position of employees in cor.rp::mies 1  dec:Lz.ion-making 
machinery  E1ust  be  seen in the  desire  to  align the different  systems 
of industrial relations in the  r1erabel~  s-~ates  so  as  to  :remove  the 
barriers to  intra-Community  movements  of companies,  capital and 
labou~c"  Therefore,  the  SU.b-Comr::1i ttee would  like  to  emphasize  the 
more  general argument  supporting the  Commission's proposals,  na:::1ely 
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"the  increasing recognition being given to  the  democratic  imperative 
that those  who  will be  substantially affected  by  decisions  m.ade  by 
social  and political institutions must  be  involved in the  making of 
those  decisions". 
JJater  on,  the  Commission  st2.tes  that  "the  enterprise,  being 
an  institution in which  fundamental  decisions  c:,r~  taken,  cannot  es-
cape  this reorganization of the  relationships between those  who  have 
the  power  to  make  decisions  Emd  those  who  must  carry  them out 
11
• 
Finally,  the  Commission  observes that  employee  participa-
tion in company  decision-making will not  be  without  an  impact  on 
other decision-making processes  :  ~~ •••  an  important  part  of the 
attractiveness  of  employee pe.rticipation in company  boards is that 
such participation appears  to  have  a  generally positive effect on 
the  other  forms  of  8mployee  participation existing in relation to 
the  companies  in question••., 
11For  the  Cor,unission,  the  overall objective;,  if not  the  spe-
cific approaches  of the  proposal for  a  Fifth Directive,  rc~ain v~lid 
and  rGasonably realistic,  namely,  employee  representation, not  merely 
presence in a  consultative  capacity,  on  the  supervisory bodies  of 
public  companies.  The  task is  to  bring about  a  situation which will 
permit  the  introduction,  in all the  Ji1leE1ber  States,  of  such  er,1ployee 
represen-G::.tiox), while  :':.Jcinc proper allowance  for their divergent  social 
t:rac~i  tiono". 
Against  the  background  of these  arguments  - about  which 
there  are  of  course different points of view in the  Sub-Committee  we 
must now  begin  b;}r  examining the  aims~  elements  and  levels of partici-
pation as  well  as its legal  framework  in order to  obtain  a  clear idea 
of the  issues involvede 
1 •  Aims  of Participation 
The  Sub-Cowuittee  is in agreement  on  a  number  of objectives 
which  e:r.1ployee pnrtici}lc.Ltion should  help  to  achieve; 
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safeguarding the  dignity  and  sense  of responsibility of people 
at work; 
lessening the  strain of work  and  improvement  of working conditions; 
- prevention of industrial accidents  anc1  die  eases; 
im.proverrent  of th0  social, personnel  Emd  training policies 
of  COElpanies; 
- improvement  of working· con(H  tions  and  reduction of conflict 
within companie.s; 
increasing company  efficiency and  competitiveness; 
- protection of the  environrJ.ent  and  i:o.provement  of living conditions. 
Opinions  are  c'ci vided,  however.  about  those  participation 
aims  which involve  giving eJilployees  8n  equal  say  in  economic  and 
social decision-making. 
Some  members  stret:(s  the  purpose participation CEm  serve 
in keeping  a  check on  economic  power.  The  growing concentration of 
capital  ::mc1  industry is putting more  e.ncl  more  economic,  social, 
and  political power  into the  hands  of large  firms  and  groups  of 
companies.  The  persons  running these  firms  not  only take  the  de-
cisions  on  investment,  production and  sales,  they also  determine, 
through these  decisions,  the  regional  and  sector-by-sector distri-
bution of production and  jobs  and  lc-.y  dovm  vvorking  conditions  end 
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productivity levels in plants..  In these members'  view,  this situation 
c2..lls  for.comprehensive  demoGratization·of-the  economg  (*). 
Other rJembers  reject this view,  stressing that  the  deci-
sions  of large. 1..mdertaldngs  arG  subject  to  a  lot of constraints 
arising~  for  exam~;le,  from  the general  economic  climate  and  from 
competition policy,  which affect  decisions  on investment,  plant 
loco..tion and marketing.  These  plus  other factors  alrer::J.c1y  constitute 
an  effective  chec~: on  economic  power,.  These  members  consider that 
em1)loyee  participation should not  detract  from the respons·ibili  ty 
and  willingness to  tal~e risks  which  are part  and  parcel  of the use 
of capital for JJroductive  purposes.  CompMies  must  continue to 
have  effective decision-making mRchinery leaving the ultimate res-
ponsibility· for the  company's  efficiency and  competitiveness  with 
managGment. 
However,  some  members  consider that  worker participation 
8l'ld  effective decision-maki;ng  stru.ctures  are  by no  means  mutually 
e:~clusive.  The  SlJ.rvival  and  economic  success  of a  firm are as 
important  to  the  workers,  whose  chief interest is th2  naintenance 
c.nd  security of their  jobs,  2,s  they are to  the  shareholders,  who 
are primarily interested in the ret'lu:n  of their capital..  ,. .. 
These members  consider that the  clash of interests between 
a  firm  v s  shareholders  on the  one  h<md  and its employees  on  the other- 9 
which  stems  from  the  employees v  wish to raise their li  vi11g  standards 
and  ·)jo  humanize their working  conditions  and  the  shareholders' 
interest in profi  t2cbili  ty and  CO:ilpeti ti  veness,  must  lJe  solved 
so::lG  way  or other,  at greater or lesser expense,  in all systems. 
(~~)  VIe  are using the term  "der,1ocrs:i:;i2ation  of the  economy"  in a 
wide  sense,  not  in the  SjJecific  sense this term has  acquired 
in Denmark,  where  it refers to  2.  national  fund  for  enabling 
employees  to  acquire holdings  in firms  .. 
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'~heTefore  emplo:f.e~  pahicdp~tion-, ..  l~speob.  ve  of  the 
form it ::1.ssumes  (provided that it takes  account  of the wishes  of 
all the parties concerned),  can  go  n  lon;~ vvs.y  tow2.rds  settling ouch 
conflicts and  recol'l;ciling in an  OlJtimUli1  manner  the  interests of 
employees,  sharehold.ers  and  the  community  .2t  large. 
The  pRrticipation of workers  8.110  their repr0sentatives 
comprises  sever-'ll  c1iffcrent  elements,  n~:.IJely  rights  of information, 
consulto.tion,  repr~sentation and  codetermination. 
Rights  of inforBation about  the  company's  position and 
progress  end  about  t1;tc  management's  pla..11.s  exist to  a  greater or 
lesser extent in  fac~ or in law,  in all the  Hember  States.  They 
form  the basis for  em  effective consul  te.tion or -.odet.ermin:;.tion 
of the  wor!cers  <.md  their representati'ves. 
Rights  of consultation have  been  granted  to  workers  c:md 
thE:ir represcritati  ves  in the l!Iember  States  through machinery of 
various  types  and  at various levels.  These  rights may  increase 
the  workers  1  say in social' anc1  economic  decisions  and  bring con-
flicts of interest betvveen workers  and  employers  more  into  the 
open.  But  they do  not ·create  equality between employers  and workers. 
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TneTcfore  1  some  mem1:wr:::;  believe  tl'lE';t  they  o_re  not  sufficient to 
er~Eurc  th9,t  1  in the  settlemGnt  of conflicts,  the  same  consicler.';.ticn 
is  g'i  Yen  to  workers 7  cmd  sh8Teholders'  interests., 
Rights  of reprcscmtc.tion  ere  e~:.ercised in the  r;Glnt:er 
Statc·s  through machineTy  of various  tylJes  P.nd  at various levels 
ei  thcr by  fjtatu.tory  W')rlter  r:~prssen  Gf'.ti vcs  elected  by  all the 
employees  or by  trade union representctives elected  onl;y  by  merJ.oers 
of the nnion,.  It is only possible  to  e:.zercise  these  rights  ;:;f:{'ec-
ti  vely,  however,  in  so :;:'s:.r  as  the  statut-')ry or trade u.:.r1ion  vwrker 
rep:r~st=mtati  ves  erij.::;y,  in  fc~ct  or in ls:n,  rights of inform::ttion  and 
commlt:.~.tiiJne  IUghts  of il'lformation  2nC.  consultation are  autoi'Jf'.tic 
·,vht=)rc  the  cm:9loyee  rep:cesentati  ves  :::'it  on  the  decision-Ina.kin::: bodies 
of pL<nts  and  companies  211.0.  of  State \)oclies. 
!Li:_c;hts  of  codetermination  - at ple_Ylt  and  company  level -· 
wccm.  that  economic  r.nrJ.  social clecisiom::.  which  hs.vo  a  b2a.r1n;::;  on 
tlE~  interests of the  I/Jorb3rs  csnnot  ~Je  ::orcod  through agaim;t  the 
wi11  of ths  workc:rs  &:c:>.::3.  their reprer:;entn.ti  veso  S'uch  ri:<:;ht:::  s.re 
based either on r..rrangemen..ts whel."eby the employees~ representative rna-. 
chinery must approve decisions before they can become effective on or- ar-
r;:mr;e~ilents  whc"reby  cr:clpl'Jyee  rcpresentati  ves  sit on  the  decision-
m.'lk:~nc;  bodies  where  i;J:lc~r  have  votin(:~ pc.ri  ty with shareholders' 
reprer_;c,mtati  ves  a  Some  ::;:ember:3  believe  thc.t  S'.J.Ch  ric;hts  of  cocleter·-
mj_nr:ttion  are  the  only  ru..r,rantee  of  .r;,  bo,l::m.c e  between  the  interests 
of  employer~:>  ;:md  workc;rs  ~ 
aES  806/?6  fin rev.  ha  ...  /~·· - 10  -
Althouc;h  the  Commission's Green Paper discusses various 
Be::ms  of  }X~.rticipation ...;.  through collective b:1rgaining,  re.pTe;:;ento.t:Lcn 
on  bodies  2-t  plant  and  compo.ny  level and  participation in tho  firr,l  t s 
cc;,pi tal - the  suggcstio~1s it makes  1?-rc  confine  c.  to board  sti'UC'tl.rre 
and  er~1plo~rcc  par-ticipation within that structure. 
So:c.!e  ::.1embers  consiC'.er this approach to be  expedient in that 
it is nakin,:s  a  etE',:rt  on  a  major area of  erc.plo;sr~·:r-cmployee  relations  .. 
However,  other members  would  point to the  fact  thc:J.t,  with 
this  c:pp:;.~oaoh~  one  is apt to  forget  that  tb:::.  incli  viclual  elelilcnts  of 
Member  Gt2.tes'  systems  of  worl~er participation s.t  c,ifferent  lo.vels, 
\Vh~i..ch  vary in i:;heir  prominence  in the  system an  a  whole,  are intsr-
dependent  C'.nc~.  complement  one  nnothor"  Whereas  the  workers  in some 
member  Stat-::s  are  more  interested in greater institu·i;ional  po.rti.ci- ' 
pation in plEmts  and  companies,  workers  j_n  other Hcr::1ber  States have 
raadc  it their main  aim ·to  s0c1..:re  greater bargEtining power for  th:::; 
tJ:ade  unionJ. 
These  members  further point  out  that the  regional,  stru.ctur2..l}· 
nati.on.al  an.c1.  international.-· :problems  of cconor;1ic  e.nc'.  :JOCJ.al  policy have 
bccmn·::::  ccntrs.l interests of workers 'and  their traC:Le  unions  in all 
r~1<;mbcr  Stat·:.:!S.,  iU'l  effoct:i.ve  s~rster;l  of worker  p<.l,rtj.cipation must  take 
in tl'lcsc  issues  too  (for :i.nstancc  in Economic  ~:...i'ld.  Social  Counci:!_r.;). 
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4.  The  machinery of participation 
This machinery  has  evo1ved  differently in the l\Iember 
States  8,ccording to  historicaJ.  bacl:c:;rm.mcl  ancl  social conditions. 
In  some  Llember  States,  works-level trade union bodies  carr~r out 
the  f"Lmctions  which works  councils  211.d  enterprise councils perform 
in other countries.  The  structure  and  terms of reference of 
works  m1.d  enterprise  COl).ncils  differ from  one  Liember  State to  the 
next.  In  some  IV!ember  States,  employee  representatives on  super-
visor~! boards  and  boards  of directors  snc1  "labour
11  (i.e. personnel/ 
industrial relations)  directors hold  a  prominent  position~  in 
,_  others,  such  arrangements  ar:e  non-existent.  In  some  Nlember  States 
the unions  and  also  the  enployers'  associations,  trJr  to  exert  in-
fluence  on legislation and  administration through informal  cha"Yl.LJ.els. 
In  ot~1ers,  this influence  tends to  be  exercised through formal 
arrangements~ for  ex2,:11pJ.e,  economic  and  social councils.  In some 
Member  States co1lecti  ve  bargaininc is n-:tRinly  at  company  level~  in 
others it is predomins.ntly  conducted on  a  sectoral,  regional or 
national lJasis with the  employers'  associations. 
In  thesG  circumstances;  it seems  advisable that  Community 
provisions on  compc..ny  structure  and  employee  participation rrt  board 
level  should be  mad~ f1ex"ible  enouc;h  to  allow the  Member  States to 
ea-Ger  for their specific historical traditions and  social conditions. 
5.  Ijega1  Frrunewo rk for  Participati~l'! 
The  legal  framework  for  employee  participation can be 
municipc;..l  and  Corm.11tmi t;sr  law,  possibly  aJ.so  international treaties, 
and  collective  agreements  at plant,  recional,  national  m1d,  possiblyi 
also  Community  and Erultinational  leve:J.s  .. 
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The  ConmmnLity  is called upon  to  provide in EEC  legis-
lation a  frameworlc  for participation which  is to  be  filled out  by 
national legislation.  At  the  same  time it must  take  care that 
this frruuework  is not undermined  by  international treaties entered 
into  by  member  State. e:;overnrnents  - as in the  case of the  agreement 
on  cro ss-·fron  tier mergers. 
Some  members  consider that worker participation should be 
also  extended  on the basis of plant--level,  regional  and  national 
collective agreements.  In some  member  ;:Jtates,  however,  this would 
require  amendment  of the  law governing collective agreements. 
In some  of these  f!Iembers'  view,  the  increase in the number 
of multinationals  also  c?l.ls for more  extensive,  uniform partici-
pation rights  to  be  estalJlished by  means  of EEC  and multinational 
collective agreements. 
Other  members  are opposed  to  employees'  rights of parti-
cipation being negotiated in collective bargaining.  They  consider 
that collective bargaining should be  reserved for negotiation of 
wages  ru.1d  salaries,  working conditions  and  social benefits.  In 
their opinion  collectivc/~greements do  not  have  the attributes of 
usua.l  sources of company  law,  if only because of the  conditions 
under which  they  are negotiated  and  implemented in some  Member 
States,  which  sometimes  involve  a  relationship based on force. 
Although recently collective  agreements  in some  l;Iember 
States have,  for reasons  connected with the  economic  and  employment 
situations,  embraced  company  investment,  this is not  to  be  equated 
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'.t:~. t;:l  e;:l])loyee  p2crticipation in  company  deci sion--maldnc;.  buch  cases 
2,rc,  ;:,1oreover  1  restricted to  Member  i)tat es  where  unions  rc:fuse  to 
share  in responsibility for the  n .  .nu1:Lnc  of companies. 
C.  Al?lJroJ:i:-nation  of  Compan.y  I.aw 
A  convercenc e  of  emplo~rees  9  meims  of  exerting influence is 
already observable  in the tlember  States  even without  action b;y  the 
Co Ellnuni ty  ~  This  converce:ace  is  explc.<-inecl  by  the  similarity of 
their economic,  social and labour rGlc,tions  problems,  wbich  tend  to 
pror:1Jt  roc,;.chly  similar solutions. 
With  the  crowing  interpen~tration of the  Member  States 9 
economies,  some  members  ::::ee  convergence of  company  law  as  one  of the 
key  conc!.itions  for the creation of  s.  cenuine  Common  1'!1arket,  c.  IJrocess 
which requires  the  scti  ve  support of  th::;  Community.  T!.1ese  memoers 
are  in favour  of  a  Directive on the  approximation of  compe,ny  Jaw 
lc:.;_,-ins  dovm  the structure of  companj_es  ElJJ.d  prescribing  e;;1pl.oyee  rep-
resentatio~'l at  board level.  In this nay the  Community  couJ.c1  help 
to  bring about  a  convercence  between the  different  systems. 
Other merabers 1  who  are  2clf~O  in favour  of  employee::'3  being 
gi  VE:::J.  L:orrJ  extensive ;r:ichts of partj_cipo..tion,  consider  tl1.e  c;_uestion 
of the  t~nJe of legal  instrument  by  ">'Jhich  company  law  j_s  to  lJe  approxi-
mated  in the  EEC  to  be  of subordinate  iDportance. 
'£hey  ta2:e  the  view,  that wJJilc  company  law  approxir:<:d;j_vn  is 
neceosary  and  is inc1Ged  one  of  the  ~::Gy  conch tions for the  cl~c::ation of 
the  co:--1eon  market  r  the  j_ssue  of  e:nplo;yee participation should net be 
strict:L;y- tied_or _sui:)orcl_inated  to  ito  Participation should  be  treated 
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as  a  sepc...:rate  issue,  a1though  ony  moves  i11  the  area of particip:olt;i0!1 
sl:_on}.d~  of course,  tc-2{e  pl2.c:e  in p2.r2~llel with the  comp::o~1y  lc.>.rr 
approxi:aation.  The  main thing is that  the participation isf;ue 
should be handled in a  dovvn~to-earth ru1d  practical fashion. 
A.11.other  group  of me:nbers  are opposed  to  a  Dire·::!tivo  laying 
dovvn  a  1miforn:,  structure for  compE.nies  in all Member  States  20J.d 
setting rl:i_nimun  standards for  employee  representation on  1)02crdsb 
Tbe;;r  ca.nnot  see  any need  to  impose  a  ·uniform  structuref  the different 
structure·r::l  now  i~.!.  use  have  proved  thenselves.  As  for  j_ntro C'cuction 
of milJ.iJJ.Uiil  standards for  employee representation on  boards~  they 
would  oppose  this· at the present  juncture  since in so:r.:e  l\~ember 
States  eT1lployee  representation at this level is not  a  practic2l 
proposition in prescmt  circumsta:n.ces. 
If the  Cmn.niLmi ty should nevertl1.eless  decide  to  prescribe 
empJ.oyee  representation o.t  board leveJ  ll;;r  means  of  a  Directive, 
the legal  framework  therefor should be  the outcome of an objective 
choice  froE1  a1nong  the provisions of n2.tional  and  Com;;;:uni ty J.a.w  and 
collective· agreements  now  in force. 
Hence,  the  Sub·-Committee  acrces with  the  Commission  when 
it says  tha~;;  the  futur-e· Community  law must  be  founded  on  convergence. 
It uust,  howeverg  make  ay,>propriate  allowance  for the differences in 
CvlJ.Jorc:,te  structure and  e:~1ployee participation arisi·ng froD  different 
econo~nic  c:md  so ciaJ_  backsrounds in the  !··:er..1ber  States. 
Some  mcm1.:.ers  consider that  2.  CoJil..muni ty instru.oent requiring 
introduction of a  two-tier board  structl~re and  employee  representation 
at 1Joc:  .  .rd.  level must  e~low a  transitional period of up  to  ten ;;rears  .. 
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Other mem\'ers  cannot  go  2,lo2."~C  with this view  insofo.r  as 
it invoJ_ves  decidin[~ now  on  arranc;er<1ClYCS  that ·would  enter into 
force  after a  long trm1.sitiona1 period.  It appears  to  theEi  a 
rather unrealistic way of r;oine;  sbout  things,  in that  a  participa-
tion cf'  eElployee  represei:tatives  0~1.  COE':)rix:ty  boards  can  on.l..y  be 
contemplated once  certain concl.itions  2T8  fulfilled 1  and it is 
impos::::ible  to  foresee at the  tir~1e  of tl!e  decision .on the  instrctment 
whether  those  conditions will be  f·L~lfilled by  the  ei1d  cf  a  trc<-~'l-
si  tionaJ  ..  period~ 
Otl:er mer11Jers,  who  are  oa~~;er  to  c:J_i,srr  the  content of 
enpl_oyee  participation~  but  c1o  not  wish  to  con11nit  themselve2  now 
to  a  two·-tier board  stn~cture  ~  thinJ:  tlmt  the  Community l)rovidons 
shouJ_d  be  desiened for  a  limited per:::_oc1  (say~  four years)  and 1ater 
reviewed in the light of the  prot~-ress  L!ac1e  in the  indivicluaJ_  J';1e.mber 
StEdcs  ·cowards  a]_j_£,'J::ment  of the  different  systems. 
Some  meEl1)erf>  take the  view that link-ups between.  cor;"t·~ 
panies in different l.Ic::E1ber  States~  p£trticularly with  [~  view  to 
1:1erger.s  1  . 2..re  impo ssi  1.::1 e-1-cnless  alJ  the Ee;:ll'Jer  ::::tates  have  the  s:::~ne 
s;y::rtef:l  of  company  1a;:1...  Without  this  1  companies  are  fore  eel_  to 
resort  to  forms  of hollins company  or other structures of varying 
suit2..~.Jility.,  .A,t:Jproxination of  compan,y  law is necessary also  to 
brine;  about  free  movement  of capital  and  to  stimulate  investrMmt. 
Some  of these  l~'!embers  would  ::;ce  the  main  argumer:  .. t  for 
approl~imation of  cor::.pc.my  1avv  not  in  economic  or fiscal poJicy  con-
sicter2ctions,  ::mt  in the possibility it would  open up  for vvorkers 
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to  s1..1.pervise  the deci3iCJns of groupn of  companies  located in a 
::cv.ui:;er  of different  Nem~Jer Statc;s., 
Another  group  of members  ask •;;hether  approximation of 
compa:1y  law is necessary  to  foster  inter-rcompany  cooperation in 
tb.e  Community.  They maintain that  c~~:perience  shows  cro ss--frontieJ: 
cocperation t.o  be  por:::f)il;le  despite the  existence of differing 
bodies of company  law in the  Community.  They  consider tb.at iater-
8ompany.cooperation in the  Community  in  iBpeded not  by the cifferen-
ces in company  le.w~  lmt  l:y other  factors~ principally divereences 
El the taxation fieJ.d.  As  the failure  to  harmonize  company  J..s.w 
is  ~1ot  the main obstacle preventinc the  creation of  a  gemline 
Cor!IT!lOll  Earket,  the moDt  that can  be  said~  they argue,  is that 
cooperatio:>.1 between c0npanies in the. Co;:u;:mni ty could be  faciJ.i-
tated if the  companies  desirous of such  cooperation had  the  ss.E1e 
structure~  They  furtht.:r  contend  that  supervision of  company 
dccicion-·naldng  can  be  arranged  just as well  in the uni  tar;sr  system 
as  in the  two-tier  system..  However~  where  board-level  enployea 
representation is 3.1JYhow  raquired or plmmed,  they feel  that, 
gen.:~rc.1ly  speaking,  the  two-tier systeu is preferable  since  em-
plo;;rec  representatives  can be  integrated better in a  supervic:ory 
board  thEm on-a traditional Board of Directors. 
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Some  members  refer in this  connection to the  Comr:J.i ttee  v s 
Opinton  of  25  October  1972  on  the  European  Company  Statutc 1  in which 
the  Cor,.uni ttee  endorsed the  propos  eel.  separation of  the function  of 
supervision,  exercised by  the  supervisory board,  and  the responsi-
bil:i.t~r for t1.anagement  exercised by  the management  board  ~ 
0 f~  shRrp 
s;:;pe.ration  of  the mDnac;oment  anc1  supervision fnnctions  vrill make  the 
responsib:i.li ties  of'  Gach  body  CFJstal-clear,  ancl.  will be beneficial 
to  the  company  both into:-cnally  llild  externallJr  Q  The  Cor:nittee  hopes 
tho.t  this  arra.."lgor.wnt  iNill  provid0  a  further  stimulus for  haY'moni---
zo.tioh  of  ·:~.ational  company  law  on  the  some  Jines 
11
• 
Other members,  though not  disagreeing,  consider that  a 
nUJnbcr  of practical rrcd  psychological cl.ifficul  ties wolJ_ld  m~is  e  in 
tho  event  of  tho  tvJO--tior  syster,.1  being  impo::; sd  immediately  on  3.ll 
p1::blic  lirJi  ted  corapat'lios  in the  r.~ember  States.,  'Il.tey  woulc~ refer to 
the~  Economic  and  Soc:i.al  Commj_tteo's  Opinion  of  29  r·~ay  1974  on  the 
proposetl  for  a  Fifth Directive  on  tho  structuTe  of  public limited 
cornpcnies  9  in which  the  Committee  caP.e  to  tho  conclusion~ after con-
sic~oring c:.ll  aspects~  tho_t  it was  lJreLlo:ture  to  impose. a  cmi:form 
structure  on  all public  companies  in tho  Cormm.mi ty  ~  11The  tv.ro 
systei213  for manageinc;  such  conpa:nics  2jj  pr:::~sent  employed  in the 
CoEm••)J.1i ty have  p'ovcd · tbe;nsel  ves  in pTactice  Emd  j_n  the  C01~uni ttee  v s 
vicvr  they  also  s,r:c·orcY"the  possibility of  eq1..1ivalent  protection to 
sh.s,rd10ld.ers  anc.  others  il .. 
Still other members  are  :fL.md.s,mentally  oppos  ec,_ ·to a 
Co!'.mn;mi ty-.w:i.cLe  apl'lroJ6.raation  o:f  corcllX:my  law.,  They  com:Jicler  that 
MoEl:)eT  States which hc::,vr;  the  clCJ-ssj_c  system  and find  ~-t  cvorks 
sati:J:fECctorily  shoulc".  be  allowec;.  to  keep  it"' 
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These  views may  have  prompted  the  Commission  to  suggest 
in the  Green Paper  a  number  of possible flexible  solution.r.;  though 
without  changing the  aim  Qf  general introduction of  the  tyJo-tier 
system. 
Some  members  support  the  Commissionqs proposal to pre-
scr.ibe  the  two-tier  boF.'..rc1  structure for  2"11  public  companies  of  a 
certain size in the  Comm.w.1.ity~  after a  transitional pe:ciodo  Though 
they can.  accept this requirement initially.  bej_ng restricted  ~o 
public  companies,  these members  consider that it should be  extended 
as  soon as possible to  cover  other  companies  over  a  certain  size~ 
Other members,  however,  consider that both the  two-tier 
system  and  the nnitary system have  proved  effective,  but they would 
have  no  objection to the two-tier  system being made  an  option for 
companies in  cour~tries where  the present  law provides for  a  ru1itary 
systern., 
They  would  again refer to the  Economic  and  Social 
Corn.;ni ttee~  s  Opinion  on  the proposal for  a  l•'ifth Directive  on  the 
structure of public  limited companies  :  11In the  ::..nterests of 
harmonization  • o.  the  Conlll1i ttee feels that a  compromise  woul.d  be 
the best  answer.,  It sU.'ggests that the  tv;o-tier  system be made 
available to  companies in Member  States 'Nhich at present  only have 
'  the  classic  system,  in other words  that the  two-tier  system be 
provided for in the  cmupan;y- law· of all Dcmber  States,  but that 
Member  States at present  empl')ying the  classic  system be  ailov;ed  to 
keep it alongside  tho  two-tier  system.  In this way  companies in 
these  conntries would have  a  choice between the  two  syster.lS." 
CES·  806/76 fin revo  hm  •••  /  c  ~. - 19  -
2.  ~~loyee Participation 
In all the Ilember  States there is a  large body  of laws 
ano_  collective agreements which  assign.s  to  employees  and  their 
representatives certain rights  of participation enabling  them  in 
varying degrees to influence  corporate decisionso 
Some  members  would  agree  to the  scope  of  the rights and 
obligations  of  er:1ployees  and  employers within a  company  being 
aligned  - insofar  a~  such alignment is necesaary for  the  proper 
operation of  the  Cormnon  Market  - by  creating a  coiPJUon  basis for 
the  exercise  of  influence by  employees  on  decisions affecting their 
jobs,  their  safety and  their working  m1.d  living conditions in 
general. 
Other members,  however,  consider that workers'  partici-
pation rights,  which bring about  a  better balance between the 
influence  of management  rind  employees,  should be  extended  on  a 
Community-wide basis to  enable  the  enployees  to  exert  a  stronger 
influence  on  management  decision-m~~ing over  a  wider field. 
This  can1.be  done  by  extending the  powers  of the  em1Jloyees' 
representative into the  sphere  of management  decisions  of  ru1.  economic 
natv..re  and  encouraging the  development  of  those  powers into rights 
of  ap1Jroval  or veto,  ond by  giving the  employees  a  say in deter-
mining  the  composition  of  the  management  or  superviso:r:y body  of  the 
company. 
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Here  the  Sub-Committee  would  quote  from  the Economic  and 
Social Committee's  Opinion  of  24  October  1972  on  the proposed Euro-
pean Company  Statute,  where  the Committee  said that  :  "workers must 
be  given a  possibili  tJr  of  collective representation of their 
interests in the  firm  and  must  be  afforded  a  say in certain of the 
firm's decisions,  but without detriment  to  the responsibility and 
effectiveness  of  the firm's management
11
•  This  statement,  reiterated 
in the Conuni ttee' s  Opinion  of  29  May  1974  on  the proposal for  a 
Fifth Directive  on  the  strtlcture  of public  limited  companies is 
still valid today in this general form. 
However,  the Economic  and  Social Committee  did not feel 
able in those  Opinions to  come  do~m one  way  or the  other  on  the 
question  of  employee representation at board level.  Although the 
general discussion  on  industrial democracy has  come  a  long way  since 
then in all member  States,  nevertheless differences  of  opinion 
between LJ:ember  States  a..."'1.d  between  the different social groupings 
about  the ·form  and  extent  of  employee  participation still remain. 
Nevertheless,  general agreement has been reached  in the 
Sub-Committee  that the future Community  Directive might make  pro-
"  ,. 
vision for  two  practical measures to  sustain the movement  towards 
convergence.  The  first would be  the  introduction of  the  two-tier 
board  system as  an  option in member  States where it is not available 
at present.  The  second  would be  the  setting up  in large  compan.ies 
which do  not have board-level eoployee representation of a  special 
body  on  which  the  employees  are  represented  and  have  minimwn  rights 
of infonnation and  consultation.  The  risht of employees  ought  to 
be  more  or less comparable  under both systems. 
same  number  of  seats_ and  votBs. on  compAny  boards  (either on  the 
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the supervisory board in a  two-.~ier structure or on the unitary 
board)  as  shareholders'  represent~tives,.  This  could also be  obtained 
by giving  employees~  and  sharehold.ers 
1  representatives  each  a  third  .· 
of the  seats,  with the  remaiD.ing third comlJOsed  of representatives 
of the  general interest  co-opted  b;'{  the first  two  groups  - one  of 
the  formulae  pro:posed  for discussion in the draft  EuropenJ.1.  Company 
Statute  and  the  drc.ft  Fifth Directive  on the structure of :public 
limi·ted  com.po.:nies • 
Other members  csn 2,cccpt  a  form  of employee  representation 
at board level  which  does  not  detract  from  the authority of share-
holders~ reprGsentatives,  such  as  the  one-third representation put 
forward  by the Conrrnission  as  one  alternative in its dr2.ft  Fifth 
Directive.  Other members  ag.s:in  fcwour  the  system  employed  in the 
Netherlands,  which  was  proposed  as  c:.  further alternative by  the 
CorJinission  in the Fifth Directive.  Under this system the nembers 
of the supervisory  boo.rd  are  ctppointed  by the  SU}JervisorJ  board 
itself..  The  shareholders'  meeting  o.nd  the  employee  representatives 
merely have  the right llilder  certctin  conditions  to  object  to  a  nominee,. 
Yet  another grou]J  of mG::JlJers  takes  the view thc,;l;  employee 
re,lresentation at  bo2ord  level is not  o.  solution that  can  be  applied 
~  ,,. 
everyvvhere  in the Cornaunity.  The  system  of worker  participation 
ndopted will have  to take  account  of the particular system of labour 
relations  and  should therefore  be left to the discretion of the 
I.~ember States.,  Where,  howGver,  emplo;:rers  and  employees  are  seeking 
e;:rployee  representation at board level,  or where this is already 
prnctised,  it must  on no  accou..'1.t  jGOl)ardize the authority of the 
shareholders~  representatives.  !lilY  other  course  woulCl.  entail pro-
fm.md  dangers  for workers,  comp8l1ies,  and  indeed for  the  whole 
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national  economies  of n'Iember  States.  based as  they are  on the prin-
ciples ofthe free market  and  free  movement  of capital,  companies 
~~d labour,  freedo~ of  establis~~ent and  free  enterprise. 
If the  Community  does  decide  to  follow the  CoJJinission  v s 
proposal  and lay dovm  Communi ty-vvide  :provisions  for worker parti-
cipt1tion,  these  provisions must,  in view of the differences  of 
opinion there are  between  the social groupings,  be  sufficiently 
flexible.  Indeed,  because  of the  big differences  between the Member 
States  r  systems  of  participation~ the  Community  provisions  cai'1  be 
no  nore than a  frarnework,  laying down  (a)  the goals  to  be  aimed at 
and  {b)  minimum  ~lies which leave  scope  for due  account  to be  tw{en 
of the different traditions,  social trends  and  ind  .. ustrial relations 
systens in the  TtTember  States.  The  important  thing is to  prevent 
any further divergence  between the participation rights of  employees 
and their represento.tives in the different  countries  8.Ild  to  open  up 
~ossibilities ffi1ich  lead to  a  convergence  between the different 
systems. 
Community  prov1s1ons  for workers 9  participation must  take 
accom1t  of the  following  : 
,·•" 
a)  llinployees'  Right  to  Choose 
Some  menbers  take· the view that  employees  in member  States 
that  do  not  ho..ve  employee  representation on  the  board:·  or do  not 
wro1t  it, must  have  the right  to  refuse  such  representation indefi-
nitely.  The  rule to this effect  could be  modelled  on that  in the 
amended  proposal  for  a  European Company  Statute. 
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Other meE1bers  are  afro..id  th2.t  if T:ler:1ber  St2.t es  hoiL  di  irer·-
gent  Tilles  f  this would  lead. to  discrimination between  coDlXt..nies  end 
to  a  danger of  companies  moving  to  cmother  col.:L'1.try  where  the rules 
v7ere  less  strL::.gent.,  They  o..ra  therefore  opposed to  eE1l)loyees  having 
unlimited  freecloi:l  of  choice.  In their opinion it would  be  enough 
to  say that  the  llUrpose  of the  Cor:1J;ll.L.Yli ty provisions  VJo.s  to  open  u~p 
the :possi  bili  t;:r  - where  the genero.l  circumsta..YJ.ces  so  :?8Tli1itted  ...  for 
firms  in I'1Iember  Stctes  which did not  have  statutory  employee repre-
sentation on  compcny  boards  to  see!: new  fon.1s  of participation on 
the lines of the proposals  put  forv.rc  .  .rfl_  in tbe Groen Po.pera 
Some  1:1embers  consider  thc:.t  employees  vvho,  either through 
national legislation or throUgh  collective  agreel:J.ents,  sccuxe more 
far-re&ching pGrticipation riglrGs  thrm the minimun1  ~:Jrescribed in 
the  Community  provisions  - either in the  form  of equnl representation 
,)Il  company  boards  or l':le,ri:;icipation  in the  company~  s  capital  - must 
not  be  prevented  frori.l  exercizing  such  rights by the  Coit1T:1llili tyv s 
':;:Jrovisions  "-
Sor.1e  of thes·e  membe-rs  cere  ll.ot  interested in  en~ll-;:1yee 
ro:prosentation  on  cny  governing  bocl;)r  whs.tsoever of tlw  conpw·w if :i.t 
is o.  Llinori  ty representation,.  Instead of  a  ninori  ty re11resentation 
they  vvould  rauch  rc,ther  see  th8 fncili  ties,  infori!lation rights  a1·1d 
povrers  of the  enployees  ~  represento.ti  ve  machinery  (the  Works  Counci.l: 
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Other  rae!~lbers,  who  want  the  shareholders to retrdn their 
ctuthori  ty,  Ol•pose  the  above  approach if only because it involves the 
dcnger  of discrimination and individual  companies  reloco.tin.g. 
c)  5'Jl~_?re  of Applieation of the  CommElli.!Y  Provisions 
Si.."lce  the  vvorker  pGrticipc:.tion question arises in a  dif-
ferent  way  for  sr,mller  companies,  some  :members  belieYe  thcd;  the 
Comrmni  ty must  lay· do•im  cri  terio. as to the  size  of  co::,lpa.nies  to which 
the  Comrmmi ty provisiono  are tc  a~J}Jly" 
Some  members  consider that these  criteria should relate. 
to  mJ..;~1ber  of  employees,  turnover  cJ.1d  balance  sheet total.  Other 
;:JeE1bers  consider,  ho\"Jever~  th2.t  the nU1:.1ber  of  employees  alone  shou.ld 
be  the  decidi::1g  factor,  since tun1over and balance sheet  total are 
not  suitable  criterio.o 
Some  mewbers  also  agree  vvith the  Commission that the  sa.JJe 
structures must  be  required for  corx;)r.nies  forming part of a  group 
as  for independent  corapanies..  But  this principle raises  a  number 
of problems,  they feel,  which,  to  ensure the  effectiveness of the 
ConEll.mi ty worker participation provisions,  necessitate rapid  s.doption 
of the Commission's  proposed  Directive  on  coordination of the  I~ember 
St:::.t es'  l.s.w  relating to groups  of  cor:Tpanies.,  That  Directive r.mst 
include provisirms to the  effect that  : 
employees  arc to  be represented  on the  boards  of 2.ll  com::_Janies 
which  make  bincLing decisions for  c..ssociated  companies.  A  parent 
cODJ.Jal'lY  may  give  ma..11dc.tory  instructions to  a  subsidiary which has 
employee  represent2.tion  on the board,  in matters  which require 
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bo8.rd  approv8l,  only if the  emplo3rees  are represented  on  the 
boo.rd  of the  po,rent  company  in the  same  way  as  in the  subsidiary 
emr1loyees  are also  to· be  represented  on  the boards  of parent 
companies  whose  registered office is in the CoEununi ty but  which 
have  a  nuJ11ber  of subsidiaries 'outside  the Community.  Hovvever, 
there are  leg2-l~  political w1d  practical arguments  against  having 
the  employees  of subsidiaries outside the Conmunity  particilJe,te 
in the nomin2tion· of the  employee  representatives  on  the parent 
comp8ll;y 
1 s  board~ 
finally,  that  eEllJloyees  are to be represented  on the  boards  of 
subsidiaries which have their registered office in the Conrrnuni ty 
but  which  o.re  controlled by  parent  companies  from  outside the 
Corununity.  The  freedom  of decision of such subsidiaries in matters 
requiring board approval  must  be  sefeguarded. 
Other mei:lbers  consider th<J,t  groups  of  comp8.llies  raise  a 
nunber of  problmns  vvhich the  Cm-;mittee  can  only  go  into  when it 
ltnows  what  the  Cominission  ~ s  intentions  are  for the Directive to  co-
ordinate  Member  Stq,.tes'  laws  rel2.ting to groups  of  companies. 
d)  Powers  of  -~~r:;  Board 
Adoption of a  two-tier boord structure consisting of a 
mon2.gement  body  and  2.  supervisor3r  body  on  which  employees  are repre-
sented raises the problem of defining more  closely the  powers  of the 
two  bodies  in the  Cor:mmni ty provisions. 
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Members  are divided in their views  about  this.  Some 
consider that the Supervisory Board 1  in addition to  its powers  to 
appoint  and  dismiss the  Management  Board,  should be  able to take 
important  decisions  concerning the  company  and its employees. 
Others,  however,  hold that the Supervisory Board  ought  to have  a  . 
purely m·oni taring fmlCtion that  does not  detract  from the Mcmagemen:c 
Board~s responsibility for the  running of the  companyo 
There is general  agreement,  however,  that the  powers  of 
the boards  should be laid down  in national provisions,  which  should 
be  progressively aligned afterwards  at  Community level. 
e)  Procedure  for  A~pointing EmEloyee  Representative~ 
The  procedure for appointing the  employee  representatives 
on  company  boards  must  be left open  by the Community  provisions  so 
that  allowance  can be  made  for the particular conditions in the 
member  States.  The  Member  States must  be left to decide  t~'le  exact 
procedure  under which the  employees  or their representatives  on the 
works  council or alternatively the  traq.e unions representatives on 
Jche  board.  matters  such  as  how  to  ensure  proper representativeness 
.  ~~ 
of the  employee  representatives,  how  to  ensure that  the  procedure is 
democratic,  and  how  to protect minorities,  cqn  only be settled in 
the light of each Hember  Stateqs provisions  and  experience. 
Some  members  urge that the  appointment  procedure  should 
not  interfere with trade union freedom  as  recognized  b;-{  the, ILO. 
A requirement  that all employees  should take  part in the appointment 
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of  employee  representatives  on  company  boards  would  be  only super-
ficio~ly democratic if this  eliminated the responsibility of repre-
sentative trade 1.:1.nions., 
Other members,  however,  point  to  the difficulty of deciding 
which u..n.ions  are  representative when 1  as  is frequently the  case  in 
sor:18  l!Iember  States  1  there are  a  variety of "Lmions  - industry-wide  9 
c:;::-aft-·based  or representing· a  specific ideological  approach  - in 
one  :.?.nd  the  same  compa..'V).yo  Therefore 1  they insist that the  electorate 
mtmt  cc·mprise all  employees  of the  com)c.mytt 
Some  members  consider that  employee  representatives  on 
compcmy  boards  should  incluc1e  persons  who  do  not  work  for the  com-
lXIiWe  The  e:;..'"tensive  relations of major  ccmpanies  ond  c;roups  impinge 
on the national  econ0l:.1Y  as  a  whole,  snd this in.akes  it necessary for 
the  employee  interest in gener::tl  to  be represented alon::sside  employees 
of the  actual  company  concerned.., 
Other Elembers  vmuld  like there  to  ·be  a  fundar;1ental  bs.n 
on  eJ:l)loyee  representatives fran outside  the  CCEJ}Jc.:ny$ 
Employee  representatives  on  company  boards,  where  provided 
for,  must  have  the  same  rights  8J:ld  cJ.uties  as  the shareholders' 
representatives~  As  the  Commission  emphasizr::s 1  the basic philosophy 
behind  ernployee  re~fcresentation 2.t  boo.rd  level is to  widen  the  aims 
of the  company  to  enbrace  the interests  of the  emplo;yees  as  well  as 
those  of the  shc,reholder...,  Em:i.Jloyee  representatives,  like all board 
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members,  are  bound  by the office they hold to  act  in the interests 
of the  company  as  a  whole~  and not  j~st in the interests of those 
they represent.  Ultimately,  it is in the  employees 9  interest that 
they should  do  so. 
3o  Transitionru_  Provision~  __  or Alternative Formulae  for  Em~loyee 
Re_],Jr•2sentation 
Some  of the members  in favour of employee  representation 
on  company  boards throughout  the Comrnunity  after a  transitional 
period are  opposed to transitional substitutes  intended to  perform 
some  of the  functions that  would normally be  exercised  by  employee 
representatives at  board level.  In their view,  the  Co~mission is 
right. in saying that  BJJ.y  transitional arrangement  is less satis-
factory than the desired  end resulto  Such trru1sitional arrangements 
cannot  be  fully  effective substitutes,  for it is not  so  easy to 
make  them  provide the  worker  with the  same  comprehensive  rights to 
information and  consultatio~ that he  would  enjoy  by having repre-
sentatives  on  the  company  board,  let alone  to harmonize  such rights 
at  Community  level..  On  top of this,  substitute arrangements,  in-
tended to  be  tempOJ.~ary,  would tend to  become  permanent  fi:>..'tures, 
which  would  perpetuate_the differences  between  employee  participation  ,.  . 
systems  in the Conmunity  .. 
However,  these members  are still anxious  to reinforce 
employees 9  rights of p2.rticipation,  and  emphasize  that their re- , 
jection.of transitional arrangements  does  not  signify that the in-
formation,  consultation and·participation rights of  employees' 
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representative institutions  ( enter1)rise  councils,  work  councils 
or plant-level trade Lillian bodies)  should not  be  enlarged. 
Other members  who  support  employee  representGtion at 
bofl.rd  level are in favour  of transitional provisions  as  suggested 
in the Commission's  Green Paper.  _They  think the most  important 
thing is to  extend  worker participat.ion rights in all the Member 
States  and  gradually  work towards  the  final objective.  They  do  not 
reg<:.U'd  the risk of substitute  arre.;,:~gements  becoming  entrenched  as 
very great  and think a  later transition to  employee  representation 
at  board level will be  quite }Jossi  ble. 
The  views  of the members  who  are  in favour  of transitional 
arrangements  may  be  SUlmnarized  as  follows  : 
The  Cormmmi ty provisions must  require those I.Ie1.1ber  States 
which  do  not  feel able to introduce  employee  representation at  board 
level  i!Thuediately to  establish transitional substitutes  which  per-
form  some  of the  flll1.ctions  exercised in the  other Member s·iJates  by 
employe~e representc..tion  on boards. 
A  member  ~tate 
1 s  tran.si  tional arrangements  for  employee 
representation must,  however,  bv.ild  on  existing,  and tried mac-
hiner-y- for this purpose.  As  the  Commission rightly points out,  the 
various  systems  for the r(_:lpresentation  of workers
1  interests are  an 
important  and  lJOtentially fruitful  element  of industrial relations. 
It is neither necessary nor wise  ·co  oJ. t er these  systems  in an 
arbitrary mam1er,  for they are the result  of decades  of  evolution 
8Ild  enjoy  the  confidence  of workers,  and,  to  a  degree,  of  employers 
and  the general.public. 
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However,  employees'  representative institutions as  sub-
stitutes for  employee  representation at  board level do  need to  be 
established at  compa11y  and  group  level,  including that  of the· multi-
national  company  or group.  The  employeesv  representative institu-
tions at  compro1y  and group level must,  as  is already the practice 
in some  Hember  States,  be  constituted  from  the representative insti-
tutions of the dependent  companies  and plants,  whether these  be 
enterprise councils,  works  councils  or plant-level trade  ~mion 
bodies. 
The  procedure for constituting these representative in-
stitutions for  employees,  like the procedure  for appointing  employee 
representatives to the board,  must  be left open  by  the Community 
provisions  so  that  due  allowance  can be  made  for the particular 
conditions  in the  Mei11ber  States. 
Institutions representative of all the  employees  concerned 
are also possible  and necessary in those  companies  and  grov.ps  which 
have  dependent  companies  and  pl~ts in other Member  States where  a 
different procedure  for the  forrnation  of  employees 9  representative 
institutions applies.  The  CoJmuunity  provisions merely need to lay 
/' 
down  a  uniform ratio of representatives to  employees  for all Member 
States.  Furthennore,  the  Comm~mity provisions must  require Member 
States which have  already introduced·employee representation at 
board level to set up  a  procedure for appointing representatives to 
employees'  representative institutions in companies  and groups  in 
other Member  States. 
Conversely,  the Comrnuni ty provisions must  also  make  it 
compulsory  in member  States which initially do  not  introduce 
employee  representation at  board level to institute a  procedure 
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for appointing  employee  ropresentc.ti  ves  to  the boards  of  com~1an:ies 
2.:-;.d  g:i.~oups  in other f!iem ber States. 
Finally,  the  Coltli!runi  t~r  Ilrovisions must  lay down  rainimru:n 
rules  on  the rights of access to  information,  rights of  consultation 
ond rights  of participation in decision-making to  be  assigned to  the 
employees'  representative institutions.  These  minir:n.JJD.  rules  sho"<L1d, 
s.s  the  Commission  suggests,  be  based  on  common  principles to  be 
derived  from the  law Bnd  practice of the  Member  Stc:.tes., 
The  Corni!n121i ty provisions should  impose  fairly stringent 
requirements  as to  information,  s11ecifying  a  minimum  which must  be 
given and requiring it to  be  given in sufficient  tj_me  for  a  proper 
. discussion of the issue to 1)e  held before  any  decision is taken., 
The  minirnmn  would have to  include  information about  the  cOD:93JlY ~ s 
mediur,1-0erm  develo}lraent  and  investment  plens  and their im}Jlications 
for  jobs,  training qualifications,  :Jay  and  conditions  .. 
Consultc.tion of  effi])loyees  should be  requirecl to take  place 
sufficiently in c.dvance  of pro j ec·ted  decisions  and  on  certC~.in matt ere· 
should be  COE1pl.'.1sor;y  to  make  sure th2t the  employees  could  exerci3e 
sufficient influence  o!l  the  decisio~ls. 
,/' ,. 
Fin2ll;y,  provision shou..ld  be  made  for  checking  on how 
decisions  were  being  ii11plemented  so  that  employees  could tackle 
mo.nagement  on  the  implem.entatio:1 of decisions  and  their  consertuences., 
The  provisions  of the  amended  proposal  for  a  Ec'.ropee.n 
Company  Statute might  P  in fact,  serve  as  a  starting point  for  c,is-,. 
c~ssing this issue. 
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The  eT~liJloyees'  representative institutions r,mst  be  c-..ssign.e':1 • 
' 
the  SG.r.le  rights to information  GS  en~ployee representz,"Gives  have  at 
board level.,  They  raust  also  be  gro.nted  comprehensive rights of 
consultatjon and,  in matters directly affecting  emplo;)Tees?  parti-
ci:p::<.tion  in decision-making.  Here it r11Ust  be  unders~cood that the 
riGhts  of access  to  information and the rights of  cons1..1~tation and. 
:J2:.rticipation in decision-making  which  are  assigned to  employees 
9 
rqJresentative institutions under transitional arrru1.get:1ents  are to 
continue to  apply  when,  after the  tr.snsi  tional period)  eL.rployee 
representation at  board level. is introduced for all conrp81lies  of  a 
certain form  and  size.;, 
..:mother  group  of members  welcome  the  Commission's  sugges-
tion that  subs·i:iitute  arranger.wnts  be  introduced in those  Tl'Iember 
States  which  do  not  t~eel in 2.  IJOsition to  prescribe  employee  repre-
sentation on  compDLy  boards.  In their view,  the Commission's  sug-
gestion is an  at-t;empt  to  open the  'ovay  for  other employee  partici-
pation syst  e!IJ.S  to  evolve  in the  ComE1lllli tyo  This new  a.pproach  should 
be  encours~ed and  developed  vnth  a  view to  finding solutions  cuited 
to  the  tradi'cimls~  social  conditions  o...,."'ld  industrial relations  systeE1r.i 
L11.  the Member  Stc::t;es  of the  Cormnunitzr.  For the  foreseeable  future 
it ElUst  be  accepted that  introdu.ction of  employee  p2"rticipation at 
board J.evel is not  the'only way  of solving satisfactorily the mw:1i-. 
fold problems  of  em}.Jloyee  participation in the·  Member  States of the 
COi!r.aunity;  there  c2.n  be  other ways. 
These  members  feel,  however,  that it is tulre8.listic to 
plo.;n  such substitute arrangements  ·t;o  operate  only for a  ~fJredeter­
mined  transition~l period,  after which  employee  representation on 
supervisory bo2.rds  would  automatically have to be  introduced...  The 
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participation of  employees  shou..1d  in their view be  i1'1troduced  in 
stages.  But  o..  progro..m.1ne  for  stage  two  cannot  be  decided u:ntil the 
aims  of stage  one  have  been  o.cconrplished.  It is impossible to fix 
in advance  when  this will be. 
These membe:+s  are in favour of a  comprehensive investi-
gation into  employee  participation_to  study the issues of  comn1on 
imlJortance  to  employees  and  compru1.ies~  irrespective  of the' parti-
cular system obtaining.,  This  could lead to  a  conception  o-f  parti-
cip2,tion that  would  form  the basis  for minimum  rules  for fixing 
employees~  and  emplo;yers 1  rights in companies. 
The  Chairraan 
of the 
Sub-Coruni  ttee  on the 
Groea Paper  o:.1  E"!,lployee 
Participation 
Sir Joh.11  PEEL 
The  Rri.pportcur 
of tho 
Sub-Comnittee  on  the 
Green Paper on  Employee 
Participation 
J. F •  CiillUOitL 
The  Secret~General 
of the 
Economic  and Social  Cor-~ittee 
Delfo  DELFINI 
CES  806/76  fin revo  mb 